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I regret that I cannot concur but shall not dissent. 
-Justice Sanford1 
When a federal appellate court decided last year that two reporters must 
either reveal their confidential sources to a grand jury or face jail time, the 
court did not hesitate in relying on the majority opinion in the Supreme 
Court's sole comment on the reporter's privilege-Branzburg v. Hayes.2 
"The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question. Without 
doubt, that is the end of the matter," Judge Sentelle wrote for the three-judge 
panel of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.3 
By this declaration, the court dismissed with a wave of its judicial hand 
the arguments made by the reporters and media arnici that the court should 
follow the more lenient concurring opinion of the fifth justice in Branzburg, 
Justice Powell, rather than the restrictive opinion of the Court authored by 
Justice White. The reporters had contended that while Justice White's opin­
ion rejected any constitutional privilege in this situation, Justice Powell's 
concurrence advocated a case-by-case balancing approach and thus left an 
opening for a constitutionally based privilege. Because it provided the cru­
cial fifth vote in the case and was the "least common denominator" between 
the views of the majority and the dissenters, Justice Powell's opinion should 
control, the reporters had submitted.4 
* Hugo Black Faculty Fellow, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A. 1993, Univer-
sity of Iowa; J.D. 1998, University of Chicago. -Ed. I would like to thank Jack Goldsmith, 
Elizabeth Garrett, Alfred Brophy, Daniel Filler, George Geis, John Neiman, and Pratik Shah for 
their helpful comments and guidance. I am further thankful for the generous support of Dean Ken­
neth Randall and the University of Alabama School of Law. 
1. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Schol­
arship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1267, 1342--43 (2001) (providing 
Sanford's quote). 
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
3. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
4. Id. at 971. 
1951 
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The reporters' argument was certainly not a new one; numerous courts 
and commentators had interpreted Branzburg in the same manner. The 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals all have pro­
nounced Justice White's opinion to be a mere "plurality."5 And Justice 
Stewart, the chief dissenter in Branzburg, later declared that the case was 
decided by "a vote of four and a half to four and a half."6 Some courts and 
commentators, moreover, have concluded that Branzburg was a five to four 
victory for the press, with Justice Powell's concurrence plus the four dis­
senters actually creating a qualified reporter's privilege-the exact holding 
Justice White's opinion rejected.7 As Professor Rodney Smolla surmised, 
"[t]he important point of the story [was] that a short concurring opinion by a 
Justice who actually joined the opinion of the Court in Branzburg in effect 
superseded the majority opinion and became the prevailing law of the 
land."
8 
The D.C. Circuit, however, would have none of it. Writing with an air of 
perplexity in response to the reporters' argument, the panel easily dismissed 
Justice Powell's concurrence as mere surplusage: 
Justice White's opinion is not a plurality opinion of four justices joined by 
a separate Justice Powell to create a majority, it is the opinion of the major­
ity of the Court. As such it is authoritative precedent. It says what it says. It 
rejects the privilege asserted by appellants .... In any event, whatever Jus­
tice Powell specifically intended, he joined the majority.9 
5. See In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983, 990 n.2 (3d Cir. 1985) (referring 
to Branzburg opinion as a "plurality"); United States v. Model Magazine Distribs., Inc. (In re Grand 
Jury 87-3 Subpoena Duces Tecum), 955 F.2d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. 
Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 
1975) (stating that Justice White "wrote for four justices" and referring to opinion as a "plurality"). 
6. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975). 
7. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
Branzburg recognized some form of a qualified First Amendment reporter's privilege); Shoen v. 
Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting Branzburg "as establishing such a 
qualified privilege for journalists"); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(interpreting Branzburg as recognizing "a qualified privilege"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Rid­
enhour, 520 So. 2d 372, 374-75 (La. 1988) (finding that " [t]he vast majority of courts . .. have 
proceeded to adopt the dissent's qualified privilege"); 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH w. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 5426, at 745-47 (1980) ("So complete was the 
denigration of White's opinion that five years after it was written, a federal court could say that the 
existence of the First Amendment 'privilege is no longer in doubt.' ") (footnote omitted). Judge 
Posner also has pondered the confusion: 
Since the [four] dissenting Justices would have gone further than Justice Powell in recognition 
of the reporter's privilege, and preferred his position to that of the majority opinion ... maybe 
his opinion should be taken to state the view of the majority of the Justices-though this is un­
certain, because Justice Powell purported to join Justice White's "majority" opinion. 
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003). 
8. Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and liability for 
Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1115-16 (2002). 
9. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 971-72 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
added); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Scarce, 5 F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that 
Justice White's opinion "is not a plurality opinion"); Storer Commc'ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand 
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Scanning the D.C. Circuit's decision on my way to teach Branzburg to 
my Media Law Seminar, I was surprised by the panel's surety that White's 
opinion should be treated as a true majority. What exactly made the D.C. 
Circuit so confident of Justice Powell's acquiescence in Justice White's rea­
soning, particularly when Powell's separate writing seemed to contradict it? 
If White's opinion were treated as a plurality, then Powell's concurrence 
would be the law. So why such faith that the White opinion governs? 
I. THE CONCURRING CONFUSION 
It appears that the answer, remarkably, must lie with a solitary but cru­
cial word in Justice Powell's concurrence. It is the fourth word of the 
opinion, the one that follows the comma after the Justice's name: "Mr. Jus­
tice Powell, concurring."10  If the comma had been followed by one of the 
other phrases in the justices' handbag, such as "concurring in part," "concur­
ring in the judgment," "concurring in the result," or some combination 
thereof, then the panel would have viewed Branzburg quite differently. Had 
Justice Powell concurred in part, for example, then the D.C. Circuit would 
have admitted that at least some of Justice White's analysis did not have the 
support of five votes. Presumably, it would have turned to Justice Powell's 
concurrence for further insight. 
The Supreme Court itself, moreover, has told us what to do in such a 
situation, explaining that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Mem­
bers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' "11 This 
"narrowest grounds" analysis is the exact approach the reporters were advo­
cating to the D.C. Circuit. But, unfortunately for the reporters, Justice 
Powell did not select the phrase "concurring in part" to follow the comma 
after his name, and he did not pick "concurring in the judgment" either; in­
stead he used the simple word "concurring." And therefore, as far as the 
D.C. Circuit was concerned, everything he wrote after that word added noth­
ing more than "emphasis"--even when it is obvious to many that Justice 
Powell did not wholly accept Justice White's approach.12 
This counterintuitive outcome leads me to question whether these la­
conic "after the comma" phrases deserve such power-the power to override 
even the more detailed analysis that follows in the body of the opinion. 
Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Justice White wrote for the 
majority and that Justice Powell's concurring opinion "neither limits nor expands upon its holding"). 
10. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (emphasis added). 
11. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion)). 
12. In all fairness to Judge Sentelle and the D.C. Circuit, the court did go on to state that 
even if Justice Powell's opinion allowed for the possibility of a reporter's privilege in some situa­
tions, it did not allow for this privilege in the case of a reporter subpoenaed before a grand jury, 
which was the situation in the case before it. This decision is likely not a controversial reading of 
Branzburg. For my purposes, however, I am simply interested in the logic the court used to dismiss 
Justice Powell's concurrence at the forefront of its analysis. 
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Should it be that by not concurring "in part," Justice Powell thereby rele­
gated all the other words in his opinion to nothing more than judicial 
residue? I believe the answer to this question is no. 
When it is self-evident that the rationale of the primary opinion does not 
hold the support of five justices, it should not be treated as a majority, no 
matter how many justices allegedly concurred. Three primary reasons sup­
port this conclusion. First, logic dictates that courts should not look the 
other way and blindly follow a false majority. Second, the justices do not 
use these "after the comma" phrases in a uniform or consistent enough 
manner to merit such authority. Finally, the Supreme Court's history of se­
riatim opinion writing supports the conclusion that the justices' separate 
writings are meant to be dissected and interpreted on an individual basis. In 
sum, I disagree with the D.C. Circuit's view that we must damn to legal 
oblivion "whatever Justice Powell specifically intended" simply because he 
made the choice to "concur" in the majority opinion. Instead, these "after 
the comma" phrases should be seen as mere guidelines to the justices' posi­
tions but should not be determinative when they conflict with the text of the 
opinion. Concurring in name should not trump dissenting in substance. 
II. THE CONFUSION CONTINUES 
As the Branzburg case demonstrates, courts and commentators are con­
fused about the proper interpretation and use of pseudo-concurrences. 
Another apt example from the area of media law is found in the 2001 Su­
preme Court case of Bartnicki v. Vopper.13 In that case, six members of the 
Court held that the First Amendment protected the media defendant's broad­
cast of cellular telephone conversations that had been illegally intercepted 
and taped by a third party. Justice Stevens authored the opinion of the Court, 
and Justices O'Connor and Breyer provided the fifth and sixth votes neces­
sary to form a majority. Under the D.C. Circuit's analysis, the story should 
end here-the Court had spoken. Yet Justice Breyer filed a separate concur­
ring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined. The concurring opinion 
begins promisingly enough, as Justice Breyer declares, "I join the Court's 
opinion."14 It is in the second sentence where things become fuzzy: "I agree 
with its narrow holding limited to the special circumstances present 
here .... I write separately to explain why, in my view, the Court's holding 
does not imply a significantly broader constitutional immunity for the me-
d. ,,15 Ia. 
If accepted as controlling, the text of the Breyer concurrence in Bart­
nicki would severely limit the holdings of the "majority" Stevens opinion. 
As Professor Smolla observed, "[t]he pivotal concurring opinion of Justice 
Breyer was in many respects more in philosophical tune with Chief Justice 
13. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
14. Id. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
15. Id. at 535-36. 
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Rehnquist's dissent than with the opinion of Justice Stevens."16 Therefore, 
Professor Smolla concluded that "Justice Stevens's opinion is more aptly 
described as a four-Justice plurality decision, a decision that is quite sharply 
and dramatically constrained by the limiting language in the Breyer and 
O'Connor concurrence."17 
Not surprisingly, there is disagreement about how to interpret Breyer's 
"concurring" opinion. One student commentator, for example, adamantly 
disagreed with Professor Smolla's analysis, insisting "Bartnicki was not a 
plurality decision." In support, he pointed to three elements: the concurring 
label, Justice Breyer's opening sentence, and the line-up of justices joining 
the majority listed in the syllabus.18 And still other observers are left simply 
confused. Another student commentator noted that "[i]t is unknown whether 
[future courts] will apply the test applied by the majority in Bartnicki or .. . 
[the] standard promulgated by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion."19 
Unfortunately, the Court itself gives us little insight as to which approach is 
correct. 
III. ANALYZING THE CONFUSION 
In an attempt to discern the proper weight of "after the comma" phrases, 
let us begin with the-hopefully not controversial-statement that the prin­
cipal job of the Supreme Court is to decide cases by making judgments. 
Coming in a strong second is the duty to issue opinions, which "are simply 
explanations of those judgments or those votes on judgments."20 While there 
is general confidence in the number of justices who support a result, prob­
lems arise when trying to determine the number who back a particular 
rationale. Many court-watchers might be surprised to notice that opinions of 
the Court do not include a "joined by" lineup like those found at the begin­
ning of a concurring or dissenting opinion. Rather, public silence by a 
justice is considered agreement.21 The flip side is also true--disagreement 
requires action, and the official practice is that if a justice differs from the 
16. 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH§ 25:45.50 (2004). 
17. Smolla, supra note 8, at 1114; see also James M. Hilmert, The Supreme Court Takes on 
the First Amendment Privacy Conflict and Stumbles: Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Wiretapping Act, and 
the Notion of Unlawfully Obtained Information, 77 IND. L.J. 639, 651-55 (2002) (referring to the 
Stevens opinion as a "plurality" and declaring that the limited Breyer concurrence "prevails as the 
law of the case"). 
18. Daniel P. Paradis, Comment, Bartnicki v. Vopper: Cell Phones and T hrowing Stones, 37 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1117, 1147 n.243 (2003). 
19. Jennifer Nichole Hunt, Note, Bartnicki v. Vopper: Another Media Victory or Ominous 
Warning of a Potential Change in Supreme Court First Amendment Jurisprudence?, 30 PEPP. L. 
REV. 367, 395 (2003). 
20. Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 643, 661 (2002). But see Linda Greenhouse, Between Certainty & Doubt: States of Mind on 
the Supreme Court Today, 6 GREEN BAG 20 241 (2003) (discussing the doctrinal debate between 
judicial "minimalists," who decide cases, and judicial "maximalists," who lay down legal rules). 
21. Although the current practice is for justices to send non-public "join" letters to the author 
of an opinion of the Court, the justices make no public statement of agreement. 
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reasoning of the primary opinion, he or she must file or openly join a sepa­
rate opinion. The reader is left to sort out the fragments. 
This system works relatively well with dissenting opinions. A dissent 
tends to be a clear signal that this is one justice who is not on board with 
whatever scheme his or her brethren are concocting. Things become murky, 
however, when a justice concurs at least to some degree with the opinion of 
the Court and chooses to write separately. In a system in which silence 
equals agreement, a justice's mere act of writing separately signals to the 
reader that closer inspection is needed to fully understand the justice's posi­
tion. Assuming that a separate writing indicates some amount of divergence 
from the majority opinion, whether greatly in substance or minimally in 
emphasis, the reader must then search for further clues to determine the ex­
tent of the justice's departure. Obviously a first step is the phrase following 
the comma after the justice's name: "concurring," "concurring in part," 
"concurring in the judgment," "concurring in the result," or some medley of 
the above. But is that the only meaningful indicator? 
The student commentator I mentioned above also relied on the syllabus 
as evidence that Justices Breyer and O'Connor were fully concurring in the 
majority opinion in Bartnicki. Yet the practice of cataloging in the syllabus 
which justices have fully joined the opinion of the Court began only recently 
in the 1970s. In Bartnicki there was such a list, but in more cases-such as 
in Branzburg--even the Reporter of Decisions had no comment. Of course, 
each Supreme Court decision reminds the audience that the syllabus "consti­
tutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the 
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader."
22 
The point of this 
disclaimer is that the reader should discern the position of the justice based 
on the text of the opinion, not on the summaries. The question remains, 
therefore, whether the "after the comma" phrases should play a heightened 
precedential role or, like the syllabus, they should be seen as mere guide­
lines offered for the convenience of the reader that should not override the 
official analysis that follows. 
One important difference between the syllabus and the "after the 
comma" phrases is that the phrases are added by the justice's chambers as 
part of the drafting process and not by the Reporter of Decisions. A very 
informal conversation
23 
with former Supreme Court law clerks revealed that 
in most chambers the phrase is selected by the justice preparing the first 
draft or, as often, by the hapless law clerk to whom the task was assigned.24 
22. See. e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1754 n.* (2001) (citing United States v. 
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906)). 
23. The informal conversation involved my emailing or talking in person with a handful o� 
clerks with whom I am acquainted from a variety of terms and chambers. 
24. See B. Rudolph Delson, Note, Typography in the U.S. Repons and Supreme Coun Voting 
Protocols, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1203, 1209 n.34 (2001) ("Even if clerks were not composing opinions 
in their entirety, they might have been instrumental in determining how opinions were formatted."); 
see also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 527 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I 
confess that I have not personally investigated the entire legislative history--or even that portion of 
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While some clerks recalled an occasional discussion about the proper termi­
nology, many did not. Could it be that the fate of the reporter's privilege 
could have taken a different tum had a law clerk thought to say, "Justice 
Powell, do you think you should add in part after the word concurring?" 
While blaming the clerks and writing off "after the comma" phrases as 
slapdash add-ons might be a simple way to resolve this question in some 
cases, it is ultimately unsatisfactory. Contrary to Oliver Wendell Holmes's 
declaration that judges "are apt to be naif, simple-minded men,"
25 it seems 
more plausible that Justice Powell purposefully chose to put concurring 
after the comma in lieu of another phrase. Commentators of political science 
research on judicial decisionmaking and strategy have observed that "there 
is clearly a norm in favor of reaching a majority opinion."26 In Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, for example, Justice Stevens in his opin­
ion "concurring in part and concurring in the judgment" stated plainly that 
he was voting the opposite of his inclinations because "no disposition of this 
appeal would command the support of a majority of the Court."27 Some jus­
tices view plurality opinions as a failure on the part of the Court to fulfill its 
duty to decide cases.28 As Professor Thomas Baker observed, the justices 
have "not infrequently sublimated their judicial egos, suppressed their indi­
vidual voices, [and] voted against themselves . . in particular cases, out of 
respect for the Court as an institution."29 
The desire for the Court to have a majority opinion, at least in name if 
not in reasoning, would likely have resonated with no one more so than Jus­
tice Powell, nicknamed "the majority maker."30 If unity were Justice 
it which relates to the four statutes listed above. The excerpts I have examined and quoted were 
unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom I assigned the task."). 
25. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295 
(1920). 
26. Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 549 (1998) (reviewing LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) and citing Saul Brenner & Robert 
H. Dorff, The Attitudinal Model and F luidity Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A Theo­
retical Perspective, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 195, 198-200 (1992) (reporting that justices shift from 
the minority to the majority in order to create a greater Court consensus)). 
27. 512 U.S. 622, 669, 674 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
28. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (suggesting that when the 
Court is "splintered," there is "a reason for reexamining that decision"); BoB WOODWARD & Scorr 
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 58 (1979) (stating that Chief Justice Burger believed that "concur­
rences detracted from the main opinion and were, in some cases, almost an insult to the author 
assigned for the majority"); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: 
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1, 52-53 (1993) (declaring it the "norm for 
judges to sacrifice details of their convictions in the service of producing an outcome and opinion 
attributable to the court"). 
29. Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the Supreme Court "Supreme, " 4 GREEN BAG 2D 129, 
136 (2001). 
30. Former Supreme Court Justice Powell Dead At 90, CNN.COM, Aug. 25, 1998, 
http://www.cnn.com/ ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/25/obit.powell/; see also Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis 
F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1855-86 (1995) (book re­
view) (stating that Justice Powell's "perception of himself as a centrist led him to believe that the 
law must be what he thought it was" and describing his opinions as a "mosaic of accommodation, 
1958 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1951 
Powell's main motivation in choosing to concur outright, however, it is un­
certain whether he did so knowing the risk that it would devalue his separate 
writing or believing his choice would increase the importance of his concur­
rence by positioning it to shape future interpretations of the opinion of the 
Court. Either way, it is unpersuasive to argue that this type of gamesmanship 
and tactical maneuvering should override the actual legal analysis of a jus­
tice when it is made available to us via a separate opinion. 
All of these questions must be examined, moreover, in the context of the 
uses of these phrases over time from case to case, justice to justice, and 
Court to Court. Even a cursory review of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
shows that there is little consistency. For example, both Justice Powell and 
Justice Breyer have shown they can and will concur "in part" or "in the 
judgment" in other cases in which their disagreement with the majority 
seems no more pronounced than in Branzburg and Bartnicki.31 It is further 
not clear whether urging the justices to be more thoughtful with their "after 
the comma" phrasing would lead to any greater clarity. How much is the law 
aided by knowing that Justice Blackmun was "concurring in part, concur­
ring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part" in his separate opinion 
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey?32 What could this type of Uber-detailed 
description mean other than simply, "Read the opinion to see what I think"? 
IV. THE COURT'S HISTORY CLEARS THE CONFUSION 
This examination of these "after the comma" phrases thus far has re­
vealed that they are used in an inconsistent, unclear, and often contradictory 
manner. This leaves little to instill confidence that these phrases should take 
prominence over the text of the separate writing when there is a conflict. 
Some might argue, therefore, that the inquiry should end here with the con­
clusion that judicial precedent includes at its core nothing more than 
judgments, and to the extent opinion-writing goes beyond the judgment, it 
is, in actuality, simply dicta. I do not believe it is necessary to be quite so 
dismissive of the explanations of judgments found in Court opinions. 
Rather, I believe the answer lies with a look at the history of opinion-writing 
by the Court. 
Originally, the Supreme Court issued opinions through anonymously 
written per curiam opinions or by the justices writing seriatim (separately) 
highly differentiated and strongly variegated but of a generally conservative hue" (quoting JOHN C. 
JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 403 (1994))). 
31. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 127 (2001) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part) ("I agree with the Court's conclusion and join its opinion to the extent that they 
are consistent with the following three observations."); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I write to emphasize [this case's] uniqueness, and 
the consequent limited precedential effect of much of the Court's opinion."). 
32. 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part) see also, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 606 (1990) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part). 
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in every case.33 It was Chief Justice Marshall who first began the tradition of 
having one justice author an opinion of the Court.3
4 
The practice was not 
universally embraced. Denouncing this new approach to opinion writing, 
Thomas Jefferson declared it "convenient for the lazy, the modest, & the 
incompetent."35 Jefferson, instead, called for a return to the seriatim style of 
opinion delivery, arguing that only separate writings give "our citizens one 
and all, that confidence in their judges which must be so desirable to the 
judges themselves, and so important to the cement of the union."36 
The first concurrence to an opinion of the Court was in the Marshall-era 
case of Sims v. Irvine.31 Even though Chief Justice Ellsworth had delivered 
the opinion of the Court, Justice Iredell wrote separately, explaining, 
"(t]hough I concur with the other judges of the court in affirming the judg­
ment of the circuit court, yet as I differ from them in the reasons for 
affirmance, I think it proper to state my opinion particularly."38 Some mem­
bers of the Court later concluded that separate opinions were essential to the 
workings of the Court and it was their duty to explain their individual rea­
soning "on all subjects of general interest; particularly constitutional 
• ,,39 questtons. 
While Chief Justice Marshall's tradition of opinions of the Court au­
thored by individual justices remains, the current practice of separate 
writings clearly emanates from our seriatim past. English courts still follow 
this approach, in which "[e]ach judge delivers an opinion separately, some­
times extempore, so that one can determine the views of the court only by 
adding up these individual statements."40 The value and desirability of sepa­
rate writings endure because they tend to be more intellectually honest and 
give the public confidence in the exact analysis of the individual justices.41 
Separate writings by the justices also serve "an important and legitimate role 
in distinguishing between strong and weak precedents."42 In other words, 
tradition demanded separate, individual analysis of each case by our jurists. 
So in cases in which the newer "opinion of the Court" system clearly fails, 
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1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 140 (1999). 
34. Id. at 143. 
35. Id. at 145. 
36. Id. at 146. 
37. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 424 (1799); Kelsch, supra note 33, at 142. 
38. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 457. 
39. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. II, 1823), quoted in Kelsh, 
supra note 33, at 149. 
40. John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 489 (2001). 
41. It is even said, moreover, that Congress today maintains the power to require the justices 
to file seriatim opinions in all cases. Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, The Constitution, and the Appel­
late Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. 
& MARYL. REV. 385, 426 n.200 (1983). 
42. Kelsch, supra note 33, at 171. 
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as in Branzburg, it makes sense to revert to a justice-by-justice approach in 
determining what the law is. 
To be clear, I do not argue that lower courts cannot rely on an opinion of 
the Court in which five or more justices wholly concur. Similarly, there is no 
question that whether a justice concurs or dissents is a reliable indicator of 
his or her vote on the outcome of the particular case before the Court. It is 
only in the cases in which a necessary member of the "majority" writes an 
opinion that in substance diverges from the reasoning of the Court that I 
contend we must view it as what it truly is-a return to our seriatim roots. 
We should, in these instances, engage in the more difficult and time­
consurning practice of opinion-by-opinion analysis and face the vague, un­
predictable consequences that flow from it. This, I believe, is the messy 
beauty of the law. And in this conclusion I hope others will concur-well, at 
least in part anyway. 
